Tuesday, January 20, 2009

The US Army Document That Proves the US is the World’s Number One Sponsor of World Terrorism

The US Army Document That Proves

the US is the World’s

Number One Sponsor of World Terrorism...

-The Cheney Vice Presidency and the White House Murder Inc,-

In a ‘manual’ which is officially to be released only to ’students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only’, the US Army outlines a program of what it now calls ‘irregular warfare’, in fact US state sponsored terrorism, insurgency, and PSYOPS.


1-21. Waging protracted IW depends on building global capability and capacity. IW will not be won by the United States alone but rather through combined efforts with multinational partners. Combined IW (Irregular Warfare, euphemism for TERRORISM) will require the joint force to establish a long-term sustained presence in numerous countries to build partner capability and capacity. This capability and capacity extends U.S. operational reach, multiplies forces available, and provides increased options for defeating adversaries. The constituent activities of IW are:

  • Insurgency.
  • COIN.
  • UW.
  • Terrorism
  • CT.
  • FID.
  • Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
  • Strategic communication (SC).
  • PSYOP.
  • Civil-military operations (CMO).
  • Information operations (IO).
  • Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities.
  • Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW.
  • Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.

1-22. The above list of operations and activities can be conducted within IW;

–Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008

The US Army document, cited above, is an arrogant, imperialistic and ill-considered response to a growing ‘threat’ –but a threat that is posed only to US monopolists and death merchants, i.e., the Military/Industrial Complex, a fancy name for Murder, Inc. The US has, in fact, squandered the limitless goodwill that had been extended our nation at the end of World War II.

The US has failed to make positive use of the world support for allied efforts to codify war crimes, to hold Nazi War Criminals responsibility for heinous crimes. But now –we have a recent US military document that the US Army would prefer to keep secret no doubt because it reveals to the world that those principles espoused at Nuremberg are either no longer operative or they were a fraud, the US didn’t really mean it. Or perhaps they forgot to tell the world that the laws applied to everyone but themselves.

The Army has now revealed to the world that no nation is safe from US terrorism, US attack, US subversion of indigenous cultures and governments, US bullying or the US use of WMD against them. That is because the US believes itself to be a world-wide empire, in fact, a single nation that presumes to rule the world.


The Cheney Vice Presidency and the White House Murder Inc,

As his many nicknames (Backseat, Big Time, Angler, Dark Side, Darth Vader and Deadly Dick) suggest, Dick Cheney has not only been the most influential vice president in history but also an intimidating adversary within the Bush administration and an unyielding advocate of using "any means at our disposal" in the war on terror.

In "Angler," his forceful new study of Cheney's tenure in office, the Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman writes that "the vice president shifted America's course more than any terrorist could have done," that while Al Qaida took a terrible toll on 9/11, "decisions made in the White House, in response, had incomparably greater impact on American interests and society."

"Cheney freed Bush to fight the 'war on terror' as he saw fit, driven by a shared belief that the government had to shake off old habits of self-restraint," Gellman writes. "With Bush's consent, Cheney unleashed foreign intelligence agencies to spy at home. He gave them legal cover to conduct what he called 'robust interrogation' of captured enemies, using calculated cruelty to break their will. At Cheney's initiative, the United States stripped terror suspects of long-established rights under domestic and international law, building a new legal edifice under exclusive White House ownership."

At the height of his power, Gellman says, the vice president "made big things happen": He "reshaped national security law, expanded the prerogatives of the executive branch, midwifed the birth of domestic espionage, rewrote the president's tax bill," shut down negotiations with North Korea and played a major role in bringing war to Iraq. Gellman also argues that Cheney, in trying to face down opposition from within the Justice Department, would "come close" to leading the Bush presidency "off a cliff."

"Angler" grew out of a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of the same title that Gellman and Jo Becker (now of The New York Times) reported for The Washington Post in 2007, and this book remains heavily indebted to those articles. For that matter, this volume builds upon the pioneering work of many other reporters (most notably, Seymour Hersh and Jane Mayer of The New Yorker, James Risen and Eric Lichtblau of The New York Times, and Bob Woodward of The Washington Post), whom Gellman mentions only glancingly, if at all, or in cursory notes at the end.

This book draws a familiar portrait of the vice president as a steamrolling force for the war in Iraq and enhanced executive power; as a vigilant presidential filter who framed issues and information for "the Decider;" and as a shrewd, secretive operative who used his years of government service (as President Gerald Ford's chief of staff and the first President Bush's secretary of defense) to hone his skills at bureaucratic in-fighting. What "Angler" does most impressively is flesh out this portrait with new details to give the reader a visceral understanding of just how Cheney maneuvered within the administration, frequently circumventing traditional policymaking channels and sidestepping potential dissenters to get what he wanted.

The book begins with the suggestion that Cheney, as head of Bush's vice presidential search committee, maneuvered his way onto the ticket, failing to fill out the grueling questionnaire he had prepared for other possible candidates and evading close scrutiny of his medical history. In addition, Gellman observes that "Bush - who put so much stock in his instinct for people, that knack for decoding a handshake or the quality of a gaze - did not interview a single candidate before he settled on Cheney."

During the Florida recount imbroglio, Cheney led the transition effort and set about putting the Reagan-era slogan "personnel is policy" into action, seeding the government-to-be with lots of allies, including Donald H. Rumsfeld, his longtime friend, at Defense, and Stephen J. Hadley as deputy national security adviser. Gellman points out that Cheney's own staff (most notably, David S. Addington as his legal counsel and I. Lewis Libby as his chief of staff and national security adviser) possessed "far more experience and force of will than their counterparts on Bush's staff."

In Gellman's view the vice president's sense of mission "drove him to seek power without limit" and his indifference to public opinion "verged on contempt." Given President Bush's well-known distaste for details and long policy debates, the vice president stepped into the vacuum, setting himself up as a kind of gatekeeper to the Oval Office. Gellman observes that Cheney guided the president away from his own inclinations on matters ranging from caps on carbon dioxide emissions to tax cuts for the richest Americans and a cut in capital gains taxes.

"Unlike any vice president before him," Gellman says, Cheney reviewed the president's daily CIA briefing before Bush, often suggesting "that the agency expand on an item and draw it to the president's attention" or cuing Bush's attention himself during the president's briefing.

In pushing for policies they felt strongly about, Gellman says, Cheney and Addington brooked little dissent and did their best to game the system. "They were geniuses at this," Jack Goldsmith, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, is quoted as saying. "They could divide up all these problems in the bureaucracy, ask different people to decide things in their lanes, control the facts they gave them, and then put the answers together to get the result they want."

Goldsmith, who would withdraw several key Justice Department opinions concerning coercive interrogation and who questioned the White House's efforts to sideline the judiciary and Congress in its assertions of presidential prerogative, was witness to the March 2004 hospital face-off, in which Alberto R. Gonzales, then White House counsel, and Andrew Card, then White House chief of staff, rushed to the sickbed of the ailing attorney general, John Ashcroft, in an effort to get him to approve an extension of a secret surveillance program and were rebuffed by Ashcroft.

Gellman also provides a compelling narrative of subsequent meetings that Deputy Attorney General James Comey and the FBI director, Robert S. Mueller III, had with the president over his signing of a directive rejecting the attorney general's ruling on the law. Both men, along with "at least the top five layers at Justice," Gellman says, would have resigned had Bush, who seems not to have been informed by his advisers of the seriousness of the rebellion, not quickly reversed himself. Because "Bush did not walk off the cliff," and a Saturday Night Massacre-like situation did not ensue, Gellman says, "and because so much of the story stayed quiet, an extraordinary moment in presidential history passed unrecognized."

After this incident, Gellman writes, Bush seems to have recognized that he "could not operate as Cheney did, doctrinally unbending come what may." During his second term the president "began to trust more in his own instincts" and also gave more of a hearing to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had frequently been at odds with Cheney and his hard-liners.

Gellman gives Dick Armey, the former Republican House majority leader, some of the last words in this book. "I do not believe that history is going to be very kind to this president," says Armey, who feels he was most likely misled by his old friend Cheney in the walk-up to the Iraq war. "I think that most of the time history is about a presidency, and a president. And the vice president is almost always a footnote in that story. But I believe that in this case the history is going to treat both the president and vice president unkindly almost in equal part."especially considering their reincarnation of the infamous White House Murder Inc, with Assef Shawkat ( آصف شوكت‎ ) (born 1950) is a Syrian assassin, and head of the Syrian Military Intelligence apparatus since 2005, rewarding him for the successfull assassinations of Mr. Elie HOBEIKA and Rafic Hariri. Assef Shawkat ( آصف شوكت‎ ) is the head of the local Damascus branch of the infamous White House Murder Inc, an extra-judicial assassinations matrix, created by the PNAC killers since 1995, and the evil axis of CIA2/MOSSAD which ensued..... Again and again, a prime criminal in murder/assassinations , starting from the CIA2/MOSSAD assassination of Mr. Elie Hobeika in Beirut/Hazmieh January 24th 2002, and the infamous : "White House Murder Inc." , headed by Asef Shawkat in Syria.